Introduction
It is well known that it is undecidable in general whether a given program meets its speci cation. In contrast, it can be checked easily by a m a c hine whether a formal proof is correct, and from a constructive p roof one can automatically extract a corresponding program, which b y its very construction is correct as well. This { at least in principle { opens a way t o p r o d u ce correct software, e.g. for safety-critical applications. Moreover, programs obtained from proofs are \commented" in a rather extreme sense. Therefore it is easy to maintain them, and also to adapt them to particular situations.
We will concentrate on the question of classical versus constructive p r o ofs.
It is known that any classical proof of a speci cation of the form 8x9yB with B quanti er-free can be transformed into a constructive p r o of of the same formula. However, when it comes to extraction of a program from a proof obtained in this way, one easily ends up with a mess. Therefore, some re nements of the standard transformation are necessary. In this paper we develop a re ned method of extracting reasonable and sometimes unexpected programs from classical proofs.
Other interesting examples of program extraction from classical proofs have been studied by Murthy 10 ], Coquand's group (see e.g. 4]) in a type theoretic context and by Kohlenbach 8] u sing a Dialectica-interpretation.
We n o w d escribe in more detail what the paper is about. In section 2 we x o u r v ersion of intuitionistic arithmetic for functionals, and recall how classical arithmetic can be seen as a subsystem. Then our argument g o e s a s follows. It is well known that from a derivation of a classical existential formula 9yA := (8y:A ! ? ) ! ? one generally cannot read o an instance. A simple example has been given by Kreisel: L e t R be a p rimitive recursive r elation such that 9zR(x z) i s u ndecidable. Clearly we h a ve { e v en logically { 8 x9y8z:R(x z) ! R(x y):
But there is no computable f satisfying 8x8z:R(x z) ! R(x f(x)) for then 9zR(x z) w ould be decidable: it would be true if and only if R(x f(x)) holds.
However, it i s w ell known that in case 9yG with G quanti er-free one can read o an instance. Here is a simple idea of how t o p r o ve t h i s : r e place ? anywhere in the proof by 9 yG(we u s e 9 for the constructive existential quanti er). Then the end formula (8y:G ! ? ) ! ? is turned into (8y:G ! 9 yG) ! 9 yG, and since the premise is trivially provable, we h a ve t h e claim.
Unfortunately, this simple argument i s n ot quite correct. First, G may contain ?, a nd hence is changed under the substitution ? 7 ! 9 yG. Second, we may h a ve u sed axioms or lemmata involving ? (e.g. ? ! P), which n e e d n o t be derivable after the substitution. But in spite of this, the simple idea can be turned into something useful.
To take c are of lemmata we n o r m ally want t o u s e i n a d e rivation of 9yG, let us rst slightly generalize the situation we are looking at. 
int G ? := 9 yG] ! 9 yG (2) here`i nt means derivability i n i n tuitionistic arithmetic, i.e. with the additional axioms efq A : ? ! A. The substitution ? 7 ! 9 yG turns the axioms above (exept efq A ) i n to instances of the same scheme with di erent f o r m ulas, and hence from our given derivation (in minimal l o gic) ofD ! (8y:G ! ? ) ! ?
we o b t ain`i ntD ? := 9 yG] ! (8y:G ? := 9 yG] ! 9 yG) ! 9 yG: Now ( 1) allows to drop the substitution inD, a n d b y ( 2 ) t h e s econd premise is derivable. Hence we o btain as desired intD ! 9 yG:
A m a i n contribution of the present p a p e r is the identi cation of classes of formulas { to be called de nite and goal formulas { such t hat slight g eneralizations of (1) and (2) hold. This will be done in section 3.
We w ill also give a n explicit and useful representation of the program term extracted (by the well-known modi ed realizability i n terpretation, cf. 11]) from the derivation ofD ! 9 yG just constructed. Since the constructive e x i s t e n tial quanti er 9 only enters our derivation in the context 9 yG, i t i s easiest to replace this formula everywhere by a new propositional symbolX and stipulate that a term r realizes X i G y := r]. This allows for a short and self-contained exposition { in section 4 { of all we n eed about modi ed realizability, i n cluding the soundness theorem. In section 5 we t hen prove our main theorem about program extraction from classical proofs.
The nal section 6 then contains some examples of our general machinery. From a classical proof of the existence of the Fibonacci numbers we e x t ract in 6.1 a short and surprisingly e cient p rogram, where -expressions rather than pairs are passed. In 6.2 we t reat as a further example a classical proof of the wellfoundedness of < on N. T h i s c ase study among other things demonstrates that the program extracted from the classical proof, albeit correct, may w ell be in need of further optimization. Finally in 6.3 we t a k e u p a s u g g estion of Veldman and Bezem 12] a nd present a s h o r t classical proof of (the general form of) Dickson' s Lemma, as an interesting candidate for further study.
Arithmetic for Functionals
The system we consider is essentially (the negative f r a g m e n t o f ) Heyting's intuitionistic arithmetic in nite types as described e.g. in 6]. It is based on G odel's system T and just adds the corresponding logical and arithmetical apparatus to it. Equations are treated on the meta level by i dentifying terms with the same normal form. R o rstrue 7 ! R r R o rsfalse 7 ! R s R rs0 7 ! R r R rs(t + 1 ) 7 ! R st(R rst) It is well known that for this system of terms every term strongly normalizes, and that the normal form is uniquely determined hence the relation r = R s is decidable (by n ormalizing r and s). By identifying = R -equal terms (i.e. treating equations on the meta level) we c a n g r eatly simplify many f ormal derivations.
Let atom be a u nary predicate symbol taking one argument o f t ype o. The intended interpretation of atom is the set ftrueg h e n ce \atom(t)" means \t = true". We a lso allow t h e p ropositional symbols ? and X (i.e. 0-ary predicate symbols). So formulas are ? X atom(t o ) A ! B 8x A abbreviation: :A := A ! ? :
As axioms we t a k e t he induction schemes Ind n A and Ind p A for the ground types and o, and in addition the \truth axiom" ax true and two s c hemes ax false A and efq A for \ex-falso-quodlibet", one for each o f the two p ossibilities atom (false) and ? to express falsity ( s e e i n troduction). Note that for every instance ? ! A of ex-falso-quodlibet is derivable form ? ! X and ? ! atom(false) this will be Note that for every such q u a n ti er-free formula C we c an easily construct a boolean term t C such t hat Z 0`a tom(t C ) $ C. H e n ce it su ces to derive 8p:
This is d one by induction on p, u sing the truth axiom ax true : atom(true).
De nite and Goal Formulas
A f o r m ula is relevant if it \ends" with ?. M ore precisely, r e levant f o r m ulas are de ned inductively by t h e c l auses ? is relevant, if C is relevant a n d B is arbitrary, t h e n B ! C is relevant, and if C is relevant, then 8xC is relevant.
A f o r m ula which i s n o t relevant i s c a l led irrelevant. We de ne goal formulas G and de nite formulas D inductively. T h ese notions are related to similar ones common under the same name in the context of extensions of logic programming. Recall that P ranges over atomic L-formulas (including ?). 
Here we h a ve u sed the induction hypotheses (3) for D and (5) for G.
Subcase G irrelevant.
Here we h a ve u sed the induction hypotheses (3) for D and (6) for G. Case D irrelevant. Subcase P. T h e n P X = P and the claim is obvious.
Here we h a ve u sed the induction hypotheses (6) for G and (4) for D. 
Here we h a ve u sed the induction hypotheses (5) for G and (3) for D. N o t e t hat the passage from ? to G can be done by m e a ns of introduction rules, since G is relevant.
Subcase D irrelevant. Then D is quanti er-free. We u se case distinction on D. I n t he positive c a s e w e h a ve
Here we h a ve used the induction hypotheses (5) for G and (4) (6). Let G be irrelevant. Case P . Then P X = P and the claim is obvious.
Here we h a ve u sed the induction hypotheses (6) for G and (4) for D.
Case 8xG.
Here we h a ve u sed the induction hypothesis (6) for G. The second assertion follows from the rst one since 8ỹ:G ! 9 ỹ:G clearly is derivable.
How t o o btain de nite and goal formulas
To apply these results we h a ve t o k n o w t hat our assumptions are de nite formulas and our goal is given by g oal formulas. Clearly this can always be achieved by i nserting double negations in front o f e v ery atom (cf. the de nitions of definite and goal formulas). This corresponds to the original (unre ned) so-called A-translation of Friedman 7] (or Leivant 9 ] ). However, in order to obtain reasonable programs which d o not unneccessarily use higher types or case analysis we w ant t o i nsert double negations only at as few places as possible.
We describe a general way t o o b tain de nite and goal formulas, following 1, 2]. It consists in singling out some predicate symbols as being \critical", and then double negating only the atoms formed with critical predicate symbols call these critical atoms.
Assume we h a ve a p r o o f i n m i n imal logic of 8x 1 C 1 ! !8 x n C n ! (8ỹ:B ! ? ) ! ?
withC B quanti er-free (among the premises 8x i C i we m a y h a ve e f q-axioms for quanti er free formulas, hence in fact the situation described applies to intuitionistic logic). Let
The set of L-critical predicate symbols is de ned to be the smallest set satisfying However, in particular cases we m i g h t b e able to obtain de nite and goal formulas with still fewer double negations: it may n ot be necessary to double negate every critical atom.
Of course this method will be really useful only if besides atom and ? there are other predicate symbols available. Our results could be easily adapted to a language with free predicate symbols.
Program Extraction
We assign to every formula A an object (A) ( a t ype or the symbol ). (A) is intended to be the type of the program to be extracted from a proof of A, 
Basis. F or j = 0 w e h a ve i = m and (11) holds by ( 9 ) .
Step. F rom the IH (11) and the assumption (8) which w as to be shown.
In order to apply theorem 5.1, we n e e d A = yA 0 and terms t j s i rsuch that (7){(9) hold. The choice of A and r of course depends on the application at hand and should be done such that (9) This is proved by induction on n. The base case follows from v 0 and v 1 . I n t h e step case we c an assume that we h a ve k `satisfying G(n k) and G(n+1 ). We need k 0 0 such t h a t G(n + 1 k 0 ) a n d G(n + 2 0). Using v 2 simply take k 0 :=à nd`0 := k +`. { T o o btain our goal ? from 8nB, i t clearly su ces to prove its premise 8k8`:G(n k) ! G(n + 1 ) ! ? . S o l e t k `be given and assume u 1 : G(n k) a n d u 2 : G(n + 1 ). Then u applied to k and u 1 gives our goal ?. Remark. Of course, in this example there is no need to do the proof classically in fact, it is more natural to work with the constructive existential quanti er 9 instead. Here is the term extracted from this proof (original output of Minlog).
(lambda (n^1) (car ((((nat-rec-at (quote (star nat nat))) (cons (num 0) (num 1))) (lambda (n^2) (lambda (nat*nat^3) (cons (cdr nat*nat^3) ((plus-nat (car nat*nat^3)) (cdr nat*nat^3)))))) n^1)))
A more readable Scheme program is (define (constr-fibo n) (car (constr-fibo-aux n))) (define (constr-fibo-aux n) (if (= 0 n) (cons 0 1) (let ((prev (constr-fibo-aux (-n 1)))) (cons (cdr prev) (+ (car prev) (cdr prev))))))
So the resulting algorithm is linear again, but passes pairs rather thanexpressions.
Wellfoundedness of N
There is an interesting phenomenon which m a y o c c ur if we e x t ract a program from a classical proof which u ses the minimum principle. Consider as a simple example the wellfoundedness of < on N, i.e. 8f ! 9k:f(k + 1 ) < f (k) ! ? :
If one formalizes the classical proof \choose k such t h a t f(k) i s m i n i m al" a n d extracts a program one might expect that it computes a k such t hat f(k) i s minimal. But this is impossible! In fact the program computes the least k such that f(k + 1 )< f (k) ! ? instead. This discrepancy between the classical proof and the extracted program can of course only show u p i f t he solution is not uniquely determined. This case study also demonstrates that the program extracted from the classical proof, albeit correct, may w ell be in need of further optimization.
We b egin with a rather detailed exposition of the classical proof, since we need a complete formalization. Our goal is 9k f (k) f(k +1), and the classical proof consists in using the minimum principle to choose a minimal element i n ran(f) : = f y j 9 x f (x) = y g, the range of f. T h i s s u ces, for if we h a ve s u c h a minimal e l e ment, say y 0 , then it must be of the form f(x 0 ), and by t h e c hoice of y 0 we h a ve f(x 0 ) f(x) f o r every x, s o i n p articular f(x 0 ) f(x 0 + 1 ) . Next we n eed to prove the minimum principle from ordinary zero-successorinduction. The minimum principle 9k R (k) ! 9 k:R(k)8<k:R(`) ! ? (14) is to be applied with R(k) : = k 2 ran(f). Now (14) is logically equivalent t o ; 8k:R(k) ! (8`<k:R(`) ! ? ) ! ? ! 8 k:R(k) ! ?
The premise of (15) Step. L e t n be given and assume w 2 : B. T o s h o w B n := n + 1 ] l e t k be given and assume w 3 : k < n + 1 . W e w ill derive R(k) ! ? by u s ing w 1 : Prog at k.
Hence we h a ve t o prove 8`<k:R(`) ! ? :
So, let`be given and assume further w 4 :< k . F rom w 4 and w 3 : k < n + 1 we infer< n (using an arithmetical lemma). Hence, by i nduction hypothesis w 2 : B at`we g e t R(`) ! ? . Now a complete formalization is easy. W e e xpress x y by y < x ! ? and take 8x f (x) 6 = k for R(k) ! ? . T h e derivation term is M := v 8m:m<0!? Lemma 6.2. Let Q be unbounded a n d f 1 : : : f k be f u n ctions from a superset of Q to N. T h e n t here i s a n unbounded s ubset Q 1 of Q such that f 1 : : : f k increase on Q 1 , i . e . Proof. By induction on k. Let Q 2 be Q if k = 1 , a n d in case k 2 b e a n unbounded subset of Q where f 2 : : : f k increase (i.e. given by t he induction hypothesis for f 2 : : : f k ). Let Q 1 be the set of left f 1 -minima w .r.t. Q 2 , i.e. For k = 2 (i.e. two s equences) this example has been treated in 3]. However, it is interesting to look at the general case, since then the brute force search takes time O(n k ), and we c an hope that the program extracted from the classical proof is better.
